By Christopher Hopkins | Hopkins PA | April 2026

Three defamation cases. Three public figures. Three losses. One week. That is not a coincidence. It is a pattern, and it points to something worth understanding before the next celebrity or high-profile personality decides to file suit.

The cases involved “Judge Judy” Sheindlin suing the publishers of the National Enquirer and In Touch Weekly, FBI Director Kash Patel filing a defamation action that faced long odds from the outset, and Laura Loomer suing comedian Bill Maher and HBO over a joke on Real Time.

Each case illustrates a different dimension of the same core problem: defamation law is harder than it looks, “actual malice” is a killer, and plaintiffs need to look steps beyond just filing suit.

The Actual Malice Standard: Be Aware or It Will Kill Your Case

All three cases ran into the same constitutional obstacle. Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a public figure plaintiff must prove that the defendant made the alleged defamatory statement with actual malice, meaning the defendant either knew the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. Negligence is not enough. Sloppy journalism is not enough. Getting the story wrong is not enough. Refusal to retract or to put the celebrity on the air is also not actual malice.

Judge Judy’s case makes this point most vividly. The court described the tabloid reporting as “baloney” and “crappy journalism.” And she still lost. The court found no evidence the publishers knew the stories were false when published or seriously doubted their accuracy. That is the standard, and it is designed to be demanding. A robust press requires breathing room, even when it publishes things that are wrong.

The Scheindlin opinion is a clean, readable primer on why actual malice remains one of the highest hills to climb in American litigation.

Patel’s case, now filed, faces the same wall. And he’s a Florida lawyer. His path to victory requires not just proving falsity, but proving the defendant’s subjective awareness of falsity at the time of publication. Denials by the subject of the piece, standing alone, are not enough. That has been black-letter law for sixty years.

Loomer v. Maher: Three Compounding Errors

The Loomer opinion, issued April 22, 2026 by Judge Moody in the Middle District of Florida, is worth reading in full. The case failed on three independent grounds, each of which reveals something important.

First: Know the law before you file. Loomer sued for defamation per se, apparently on the theory that accusing someone of adultery is actionable on its face. But under Florida law, a plaintiff suing a media defendant must plead and prove actual damages, even in a per se case. That has been the rule since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. in 1974. The court called the plaintiff out on it. This is not an obscure corner of the doctrine.

With lawyers who represent celebrities and high-profile personalities, this kind of gap shows up with surprising regularity as those lawyers venture into defamation law. Research, preparation, and client communication are steps which cannot be overlooked.

Second: The actual malice standard remains a very high wall. This is the third case this week where a public figure plaintiff failed to clear it. Perhaps… there’s something to consider here? In this case, one problem was the plaintiff’s own deposition testimony. The record she created didn’t just defeat malice, it handed the defense its entire “not a false statement of fact” argument. When your pleadings conflict with your client’s testimony, see point #1 above. Do some planning first before filing.

Third: The late-night comedian exception. Courts have long applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to distinguish protected opinion from actionable fact. Judge Moody’s opinion does something more specific. It distills that test into a clear three-part framework for comedy: (a) a well-known comedian (b) makes a statement on a program centered around jokes (c) in a context punctuated by audience laughter or groans. Satisfy all three, and the statement-of-fact element fails as a matter of law.

This framework is new in its specificity. The court even addressed the groans: a groan is a standard audience reaction to a joke that lands badly, and it is evidence the audience understood they were watching comedy, not receiving a news report. Ellen DeGeneres, Jerry Seinfeld, and now Bill Maher. The pattern in the case law is clear, and it now has a more defined shape.

What All Three Cases Have in Common

Strip away the celebrity names and the headlines, and the same lessons repeat across all three cases.

Public figure status is itself a significant hurdle, and many potential plaintiffs do not appreciate just how high it raises the bar before the first pleading is drafted. The actual malice standard does not just make cases harder to win at trial. It makes them harder to survive summary judgment, and in some cases harder to survive a motion to dismiss.

Defamation law is also a specialty within a specialty. It sits at the intersection of tort law, constitutional law, and First Amendment doctrine, and it varies meaningfully by jurisdiction. A lawyer who handles celebrity matters, entertainment work, or general civil litigation may be excellent at those things and still underprepared for the specific architecture of a defamation claim against a media (or social media) defendant.

Finally, the losing party rarely announces the loss. Judge Judy’s defeat got far less coverage than her lawsuit. Kash Patel’s filing made national headlines; the dismissal, when it comes, will likely make far fewer. Laura Loomer’s social media feed has been active since the order, but silent about the case itself. That asymmetry is worth noting, because it feeds the misperception that these cases are viable when, in many instances, they are not.

If you have a potential defamation claim or you are facing one, the most valuable thing a qualified attorney can do is give you an honest assessment before you file (or respond), not after. The First Amendment was designed to protect robust, even uncomfortable speech about public figures. There are a host of defenses as well as lesser known hurdles and requirements. Use them to your advantage. Understanding exactly where that protection ends, and where a viable claim begins, requires more than a grievance and a retainer.

Christopher B. Hopkins is a Florida civil litigation and appellate attorney and principal of Hopkins PA, located in West Palm Beach. He is admitted in Florida, New York, and the District of Columbia, holds an AV Preeminent Rating, and serves as a Florida circuit civil mediator and qualified arbitrator. He is also an adjunct professor teaching constitutional law, moot court, and litigation.