

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND
FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 50-2026-CA-002555-XXX-AMB

TRISTAN TATE, an individual and
ANDREW TATE, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

X CORP. (f/k/a 'Twitter'),

Defendant.

_____ /

NON-PARTIES' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

Non-parties, **JANE DOE** a/k/a @Therealsuzywyn1, **JACK DOE** a/k/a @Gadget44027447, **ROSE DOE** a/k/a @frmthebroknside, and **JOHN DOE** a/k/a @CrayonMurders, without waiving any rights or objections to jurisdiction, move this Court for a protective order and state:

Plaintiffs, Tristan Tate and Andrew Tate, filed their Amended Complaint for Pure Bill of Discovery against X Corp., seeking the disclosure of personally identifying information of Jane Doe, Jack Doe, Rose Doe, and John Doe (the "Does"). The Pure Bill of Discovery is an attempt to circumvent Florida's jurisdictional requirements and unmask anonymous users of X who have engaged in protected speech.

In a related action, *Andrew Tate et al. v. Doe Defendants et al.*, Case No. 2025-CA-002559("Related Action"), Plaintiffs previously asked this Court to issue subpoenas compelling social media platforms to disclose the same personally identifying information regarding the Does. The Court denied the

Plaintiffs' motion for lack of jurisdiction. (See Ex. A, 12/26/2025 Order ¶ 28). Jurisdiction has never been obtained over the Does.

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint in the Related Action failed to identify actual individual defendants. "In Florida, the filing of a 'John Doe' complaint, without more, does not commence an action against a real party." *Gilliam v. Smart*, 809 So. 2d 905, 908 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (citing *Grantham v. Blount*, 683 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)). A defendant must be served and personal jurisdiction secured before any such action may proceed.

Beyond failing to name actual individual defendants, the Amended Complaint showed no connection to Palm Beach County. It alleged that Plaintiffs are "social media influencers" who reside in Romania, and it further alleged that (the same) Jack Doe, Rose Doe, and John Doe are not Florida residents. (See Case No. 2025-CA-002559, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 4, 7, 10, 25). Plaintiffs alleged only that the Doe defendants posted defamatory statements on social media that were accessed within Florida. (Case No. 2025-CA-002559, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 21, 23). Plaintiffs alleged no facts showing that the Does had contacts with Florida or that they had purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within Florida.

The Court, in the Related Action, already ruled that, "social media statements published by non-resident Defendants Gaeton, Jury, and Livingstone about the non-resident Plaintiffs, even if read by someone in Florida, alone, does not satisfy the second and third Estes elements." (See Ex. A, 12/26/2025 Order ¶ 20).

If the Court lacks jurisdiction over the Related Action, it necessarily lacks jurisdiction over a pure bill seeking to unmask defendants for purposes of pursuing the Related Action.

Plaintiffs, meanwhile, have made no effort to distinguish their grounds for jurisdiction. First, Plaintiffs relied upon and attached their Amended Complaint from the related case to their Amended Complaint in this case. Second, the Plaintiffs allege that “[j]urisdiction is proper over the Defendant and the Doe Defendants [sic] pursuant to Florida Statutes 48.193(1)(a)(2) for committing, facilitating, and allowing a tortious act within this state.” Am. Compl. ¶ 6. The Court will note that the Plaintiffs incorrectly referred to the non-party Does as the “Doe Defendants.” This error arises because Plaintiffs copied their jurisdictional allegation from the Related Action's Amended Complaint and added “the Defendant” (referring to X). (See Case No. 2025-CA-002559, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 4, 7, 10, 19-20). Once again, if the Court lacks jurisdiction over the allegations in the related case, Plaintiffs cannot plead the same basis and obtain jurisdiction in this action.

Jurisdiction over a defendant requires sufficient contacts with Florida. When a nonresident defendant is involved, the Court must consider both Florida statutory law and constitutional due process. *Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais*, 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989). Florida's long-arm statute, Section 48.193, provides a list of specific actions that may subject a person to jurisdiction in Florida. Beyond satisfying the long-arm statute, the Court must also satisfy due process requirements to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident. *Venetian Salami Co.* at 499. All three of the following factors must be met:

(1) whether the plaintiff's claims "arise out of or relate to" at least one of the defendant's contacts with the forum;

(2) whether the nonresident defendant "purposefully availed" himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefit of the forum state's laws; and

(3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

Estes v. Rodin, 259 So. 3d 183, 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (quoting *Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri*, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013)). Plaintiffs met neither the requirements of Florida's long-arm statute nor constitutional due process.

In *Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall*, 39 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2010), the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether a nonresident defendant's website activity could subject her to jurisdiction in Florida. The Court distinguished communications purposefully directed into Florida from web postings that merely happen to be accessed by someone here. A defendant can commit a tort from outside the state by calling, emailing, or mailing a letter to someone in Florida. *Id.* at 1206-08. Those activities are different from a defendant posting information on a website that might be accessed from anywhere.

A defendant who posts defamatory material about a Florida resident that is accessed by a reader in Florida may be considered to have directed a communication into Florida. *Id.* at 1214-15. **A non-resident defendant, however, could not reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Palm Beach County for posting on social media about Plaintiffs, who reside in**

Romania. “Having an ‘interactive website’ ... should not open a defendant up to personal jurisdiction in every spot on the planet where that interactive website is accessible.” *Estes v. Rodin*, 259 So. 3d 183, 197 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (citations omitted).

On December 26, 2025, the Court dismissed the Amended Complaint in the Related Action without prejudice and instructed Plaintiffs that “[a]ny amendment shall name actual defendants and be supported by a good-faith, fact-based basis for personal jurisdiction.” (Ex. A, 12/26/2025 Order ¶ 35). To date, Plaintiffs have not identified the Doe defendants, have not served them, and have not provided any basis for personal jurisdiction.

Instead, Plaintiffs filed the instant Pure Bill of Discovery against X Corp. Once again, they fail to allege facts that would establish personal jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs make no attempt to plead general or specific jurisdiction over X. They allege that X Corp. is a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. (Pure Bill ¶ 5). Plaintiffs generally allege that X conducts business and has customers in Florida, but they allege no other jurisdictional facts. (Pure Bill ¶ 7). They again point to the Does’ anonymous posts on social media. (Pure Bill ¶ 9). Plaintiffs fail to plead any plain statement of fact which meets the standards of *Venetian Salami*. Moreover, Florida courts have declined to extend long-arm jurisdiction for pure bill of discovery claims against non-resident corporations. *USAA Casualty Ins. Co. v. MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC*, 425 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025); *Facebook, LLC v. Grind Hard Holdings, LLC*, 390 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)(Florida court lacked

jurisdiction over social media platform in a pure bill action to unmask anonymous "Doe" defendant).

Requiring X Corp. to disclose personally identifying information of its users would violate the Does' First Amendment rights and chill protected speech. "[A]n author's decision to remain anonymous... is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment." *McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n*, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995). A court should apply a high standard before allowing a public figure to unmask an anonymous critic because "[t]he possibility of losing anonymity in a future lawsuit could intimidate anonymous posters into self-censoring their comments or simply not commenting at all." *Doe v. Cahill*, 884 A. 2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005). In this instance, intimidation of anonymous speakings is not simply a *possibility*, it is Plaintiffs' intended purpose.¹

¹ **Plaintiffs have made public their intention to abuse legal process in order to torment defendants and threaten critics with litigation.** See Tristan Tate, [Andrew Tate's Lawsuit Exposed](#) (Oct. 22, 2025)("You know that house your mother owns. Your father, your uncle. Where you live, your business. I'm going to take everything you have."); *Id.* at 3:41 ("I've got a lot of people to sue, my people to sue list is very, very long, and I've got, probably, you know, a good 10 to 15 years of this, I'm going to be suing people, all the time, for the rest of my life. **Even if it just bankrupts them and I don't win any money, it will just be funny.**")(emphasis added); Tristan Tate, [Disruptors Podcast](#) (June 30, 2025)("**Anyone worth suing. So yeah, I'm going to sue loads of people, just because I think it's funny.**")(emphasis added); *Id.* at 1:04 ("I don't know who I'm suing, but the moment I see one mistake, oh, you missed the word allegedly, oh, you said he's a rapist, you didn't say allegedly, boom, sue him. Anyone worth suing. So yeah, I'm going to sue loads of people, just because I think it's funny."); Andrew Tate, [The Unplugged Alpha](#) (Jan. 20, 2022)("I will sue you for any and every reason, forever. And you're going to have to hire lawyers and turn up, forever. I will do that. I'm that guy. I'm petty. **I'm petty and I've got a lot of money and a lot of time. So it's not even about 'guilty,' it's not about 'why,' it's just about because I can.**")(emphasis added); *Id.* at 11:12 ("It's one of the many, many things I was going to do. I'd buy the property next to his father's Airbnb and list it for free. I will bankrupt you. You don't understand the levels I will go to. I'm that guy... and he felt it because people turned up at his door.").

In *Cahill*, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he sudden surge in John Doe suits stems from the fact that many defamation actions are not really about money... [t]he goals of this new breed of libel action are largely symbolic, the primary goal being to silence John Doe and others like him.” *Id.* (quoting Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, *Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace*, 49 Duke L.J. 855, 872, 859 (2000)). A protective order is necessary to prevent irreparable harm and oppression, including the loss of anonymity and the chilling of protected speech. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(d) (“the court... may make any order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense that justice requires.”).

A pure bill of discovery is a “relatively rare” procedure that may not be used as an “investigative tool ‘to seek information that might uncover a potential claim.’” *Kaplan v. Allen*, 837 So. 2d 1174, 1176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citation omitted). Rather, a plaintiff must justify its use. *Id.* The procedure “is not to be used as a fishing expedition.” *Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Frazier*, 696 So. 2d 1369, 1371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); see also *JM Family Enterprises, Inc. v. Freeman*, 758 So. 2d 1175, 1176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). This Court must put an end to Plaintiffs’ fishing expedition.

WHEREFORE, non-parties, JANE DOE a/k/a @Therealsuzywyn1, JACK DOE a/k/a @Gadget44027447, ROSE DOE a/k/a @frmthebroknside, and JOHN DOE a/k/a @CrayonMurders’, request that this Court enter a protective order prohibiting the disclosure of the Does’ personally identifying information.

Dated: April 7, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

HOPKINS PA
Attorneys for Jane Doe, Jack Doe, Rose
Doe, and John Doe

/s/ Christopher B. Hopkins
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been filed with the Clerk and all attorneys of record using Florida's e-Filing Portal on April 7, 2026.

By: Christopher B. Hopkins
Attorney

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND
FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 50-2025-CA-002559-XXX-AMB

TRISTAN TATE, an individual and
ANDREW TATE, an individual

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN DOE a/k/a @CrayonMurders,
et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER ON DECEMBER 4, 2025, SPECIAL SET HEARING

THIS MATTER, having come before the Court at a Special Set Hearing on
December 4, 2025 on the following Motions:

1. Plaintiffs' Omnibus Motion for Order to Disclose User and Account Identification Information for Purposes of Identifying True Name of Party Defendant to Litigation and Motion to Order Defendant, @CrayonMurders (and others purportedly represented) to Disclose Identity for Service of Process and Oppositions to Objection of Crayon Murders (DE 136);
2. Defendant John Doe a/k/a @CrayonMurders' Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Quash Improper Service on Secretary of State, Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Effectuate Service of Process, and Opposition to Motion to Strike (DE 138);
3. Defendant Jury's Verified Motion to Quash Service of Process and/or Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (DE 141);
4. Three "Doe" Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion to Quash Improper Service on the Secretary of State (DE 143);
5. Defendant Nathan Livingstone's Motion to Quash Service of Process and Motion to Dismiss (and Supplement) (DE 163 and DE 190); and
6. Defendant Eleanor K. Gaetan's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Improper Service of Process and Lack of Jurisdiction (DE 173);

and the Court, having reviewed the motions, the responses and replies, as applicable, and

having heard argument of counsel and being fully advised of the premises, it is hereby:

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. The parties' Motions can be reduced to three issues: (i) whether the Plaintiffs may sue "John Doe" Defendants; (ii) whether there is personal jurisdiction over the moving Defendants; and (iii) whether service on the moving defendants was proper.

2. For the reasons set forth in this Order, the Court determines that (i) Florida law does not permit Plaintiffs to sue "John Doe" Defendants; (ii) dismissal without prejudice is warranted for a lack of personal jurisdiction over the moving Defendants; and (iii) service on the moving Defendants was improper and is hereby quashed.

Plaintiffs Cannot Sue "Doe" Defendants

3. The Court agrees with the moving "Doe" Defendants that Plaintiffs may not sue "John Doe" defendants. See *Gilliam v. Smart*, 809 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)(filing of a "John Doe" complaint does not commence an action); *Liebman v. Miami-Dade Co. Code Compliance Office, et al.*, 54 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)("In the absence of a statute authorizing such a procedure, the filing of a "John Doe" complaint is not sufficient to commence an action...").

4. The Plaintiffs' reliance on federal court authority is unavailing. See *Vielma v. Gruler et al.*, 808 F. App'x 872, 2020 WL 1672778 (11th Cir. (Fla.) April 6, 2020) ("Plaintiffs have failed to heed the court's repeated warnings that fictitious-party pleading was prohibited" and "[a]s a general matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court"); *Quad International, Inc. v. John Doe*, 2013 WL 718448 (S.D.AL. Jan. 7, 2013)("Despite the court's order, plaintiff has not addressed binding Circuit precedent concerning fictitious party practice nor shown how the proposed exception fits within the framework established by such precedent.")

Plaintiffs Lack Personal Jurisdiction Over Moving Defendants

I. Factual Background

5. Plaintiffs Andrew and Tristan Tate reside in Romania (Amended Complaint, paragraph 1).

6. Defendants Gaeton, Jury, and Livingstone filed supporting affidavits denying

the Plaintiffs' allegations relating to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them, and affirmatively stating that:

a. Defendant Gaeton is a resident of Washington, D.C., who has never resided in Florida, is not licensed or registered to do business in the State of Florida, does not own or hold any real or personal property in Florida, does not maintain an office or residence or operate a business in the State of Florida, and otherwise has no contacts with the State of Florida.

b. Defendant Jury is a UK citizen and resident who has never visited nor been a resident of Florida; has never been employed, conducted business, or maintained an office in Florida; has no property or bank accounts in Florida; and has never paid taxes in Florida.

c. Defendant Livingstone is an Australian citizen and resident who has never been a resident of Florida; has never been employed, conducted business, or maintained an office in Florida; has no property or bank accounts in Florida; and has never paid taxes in Florida.

7. In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Gaeton, Jury, and Livingstone published statements on social media which were directed into and read by persons inside of Florida.

8. Plaintiffs did not file affidavits or evidence disputing the affidavits of Gaeton, Jury, and Livingstone or otherwise supporting the jurisdictional allegations in the Amended Complaint.

II. Legal Standard

9. Rule 1.140 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complainant to sufficiently allege a prima facie case, including pleading the basis of the court's exercise of jurisdiction in the matter. See Order Granting Defendant Mary Doe's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, *Tristan and Andrew Tate v. Mary Doe et al.*, Case No. 50-2023-CA-011904-XXXX-MB (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Nov. 27, 2024); *Continental Baking Co. v. Vincent*, 634 So. 2d 242, 244 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).

10. The Florida Supreme Court has established a two-prong analysis for a court to consider when evaluating whether personal jurisdiction is proper. First, the court asks whether Florida's long-arm statute is satisfied such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant is proper. *Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais*, 554 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1989). Second, the court asks whether the defendant has minimum contacts with Florida such that the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" under *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

11. The first prong of the analysis is statutory and is governed by section 48.193, Florida Statutes. The second prong is constitutional and is controlled by United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Due Process Clause and imposes a more restrictive requirement.

12. "In the context of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in which no evidentiary hearing is held, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of jurisdiction over the movant, nonresident defendant." *Morris v. SSE, Inc.*, 843 F.2d 489, 492 (11th Cir. 1988). The Court must accept as true all facts alleged in the Complaint only if they are not controverted by the facts in the defendant's affidavit.

13. Where defendants file affidavits showing a lack of jurisdiction, the burden shifts back to plaintiffs to show by affidavit the basis for jurisdiction. *OSI Indus., Inc. v. Carter*, 834 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

14. Where a defendant's affidavit "does fully dispute the jurisdictional allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by affidavit or other sworn proof that a basis for long-arm jurisdiction exists." *Hilltopper Holding Corp. v. Est. of Cutchin ex rel. Engle*, 955 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). "If the plaintiff fails to come forward with sworn proof to refute the allegations in the defendant's affidavit and to prove jurisdiction, the defendant's motion to dismiss must be granted." *Id.*

III. Legal Analysis

15. In support of their personal jurisdiction arguments in their various Motions,

moving Defendants Gaeton, Jury, and Livingstone filed affidavits disputing any basis for the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims against them.

16. Plaintiffs failed to file any affidavit or declaration as required in support of their showing that this Court has jurisdiction over their claims against Defendants Gaeton, Jury, and Livingstone, relying solely on the allegations made in their Amended Complaint.

17. Even if Plaintiffs had come forward with evidence, they would have to establish all three elements as stated in *Estes v. Rodin*, 259 So. 3d 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018):

- a. whether the plaintiff's claims "arise out of or relate to" at least one of the defendant's contacts with the forum;
- b. whether the nonresident defendant "purposefully availed" himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefit of the forum state's laws; and
- c. whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

Id. at 192 (citation omitted).

18. In this case, Plaintiffs argued the first element but did not sufficiently plead or present evidence to make the requisite findings for the second and third elements.

19. The Court finds, based upon the evidence presented, that Defendants Gaeton, Jury, and Livingstone did not purposefully avail themselves of the privileges of conducting activities within Florida and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over these Defendants would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

20. The Court concludes that social media statements published by non-resident Defendants Gaeton, Jury, and Livingstone about the non-resident Plaintiffs, even if read by someone in Florida, alone, does not satisfy the second and third *Estes* elements.

SERVICE ON MOVING DEFENDANTS IS QUASHED

21. Relative to service of process under § 48.161, Florida Statutes, due process requires strict compliance with the statutory requirements. *Monaco v. Nealon*, 810 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

22. Florida Statute, § 48.161 proscribes the method for effecting service of process through the Secretary of State, and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(1) **When authorized by law**, substituted service of process on a nonresident individual or a corporation or other business entity incorporated or formed under the laws of any other state, territory, or commonwealth, or the laws of any foreign country, may be made by sending a copy of the process to the office of the Secretary of State. Such process must be issued in the name of the party to be served, in the care of the Secretary of State, and must be made by personal delivery; by registered mail; by certified mail, return receipt requested; by use of a commercial firm regularly engaged in the business of document or package delivery; or by electronic transmission. Such service is sufficient service on a party that has appointed or is deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State as such party's agent for service of process.

(2) When an individual or a business entity is a nonresident or conceals his, her, or its whereabouts, the party seeking to effectuate service may, **after exercising due diligence to locate and effectuate personal service**, use the substituted service method specified in subsection (1) in connection with any action in which the court has jurisdiction over the individual or business entity.

§48.191(1) & (2), Florida Statutes (emphasis added)

23. The authorizing statute for effecting substituted service through the Secretary of State on a non-resident who is alleged to be concealing their whereabouts is § 48.181(4), Florida Statutes which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(4) Any individual or foreign business entity that conceals its whereabouts is deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State as its agent on whom all process may be served, **in any action or proceeding against such individual or foreign business entity, arising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to any business or business venture carried on in this state by such individual or foreign business entity.**

§ 48.181(4), Florida Statutes (emphasis added).

24. As to Plaintiffs' attempted substituted service on the moving "John Doe" Defendants by serving the Secretary of State, Plaintiffs did not include the actual names of the "John Doe" Defendants, did not send a copy of the process to any physical address; have not sufficiently set forth the party's concealment of whereabouts; and have not sufficiently established that they have exercised due diligence to locate and effectuate personal service. As such, as to the "John Doe" Defendants, Plaintiffs do not meet the requirements of § 48.161(1)-(2), Florida Statutes

25. As to Plaintiffs attempted substituted service Florida law is clear that “[t]o support substituted service of process on a defendant the complaint must allege the jurisdictional requirements prescribed by statute.” *Wiggam v. Bamford*, 562 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)(*quoting Drake v. Scharlau*, 353 So.2d 961, 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)).

26. The Amended Complaint does not include allegations that Defendants Gaeton or Livingstone concealed their whereabouts or that the causes of action against them arose out of any transaction or operation connected or incidental any business conducted in Florida by either Defendant. Likewise, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently established that they have exercised due diligence to locate and effectuate personal service. Accordingly, as to Defendants Gaeton and Livingstone, Plaintiffs do not meet the requirements of § 48.161(1)-(2), Florida Statutes or §48.181, Florida Statutes, and have not established that they are entitled to serve either of these defendants through the Secretary of State.

27. Defendant Jury had sought to quash service but was personally served thereafter and withdrew that portion of his motion.

CONCLUSION

28. Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Motion for Order to Disclose User and Account Identification Information for Purposes of Identifying True Name of Party Defendant to Litigation and Motion to Order Defendant, @CrayonMurders (and others purportedly represented) to Disclose Identity for Service of Process and Oppositions to Objection of Crayon Murders is hereby **DENIED**. This Motion is denied because the court lacks jurisdiction over the Defendants.

29. Defendant John Doe a/k/a @CrayonMurders’ Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Quash Improper Service on Secretary of State, Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to Effectuate Service of Process, and Opposition to Motion to Strike is hereby **GRANTED**.

30. Jury’s Verified Motion to Quash Service of Process and/or Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is hereby **GRANTED** (as to dismissal).

31. Three “Doe” Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion to Quash Improper Service on the Secretary of State is hereby **GRANTED**.

32. Defendant Nathan Livingstone’s Motion to Quash Service of Process and Motion to Dismiss is hereby **GRANTED**.

33. Defendant Eleanor K. Gaetan’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Improper Service of Process and Lack of Jurisdiction is hereby **GRANTED**.

34. The granting of the Defendants’ motions is **WITHOUT PREJUDICE**.

35. The Plaintiffs have twenty (20) days to amend their complaint. Any amendment shall name actual defendants and be supported by a good-faith, fact-based basis for personal jurisdiction. Service of process shall occur consistent with this Order and applicable law.

36. Plaintiffs then have sixty (60) days from the date of the filing of any amended Complaint to either affect service of process on Defendants.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida.

50-2025-CA-002559-XXXX-MB 12/26/2025
G. Joseph Curley, Jr. Circuit Judge
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURT

50-2025-CA-002559-XXXX-MB 12/26/2025
G. Joseph Curley, Jr.
Circuit Judge

Jr.
Copies to: All Parties of Record

G. Joseph Curley,
Circuit Judge